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The development of modern information and communication tech-
nologies (ICTs) has led to a renewed interest in the phenomenon of 
‘collective intelligence’ (also described as the ‘wisdom of the crowds’, 
Surowiecki, 2005). Collective intelligence refers to the capacity to mobi-
lise and coordinate the expertise and creativity possessed by large groups 
of individuals in order to solve problems and create new knowledge. 
Although this can be done offline, ICTs make it far easier for large groups 
of individuals to work collectively on common tasks, for example by 
removing the need for physical proximity, allowing for asynchronous 
communication and making it possible for single individuals to transmit 
information to very large groups (Wellman, 1997). These advantages 
have allowed online networks to solve iconic mathematics problems 
(Polymath, 2009; Gowers and Nielsen, 2009), create the world’s largest 
reference work, Wikipedia (Almeida, 2007), and even challenge grand-
master Garry Kasparov to a game of chess (Nielsen, 2011). 
In the light of these developments, scholars have suggested that by 
harnessing collective intelligence, it may be possible dramatically to 
improve society’s ability to tackle seemingly intractable social problems 
(e.g., Rushkoff, 2003; Howe, 2006; Tapscott and Williams, 2006; 2010). 
Theoretically, it is clear that there are certain types of tasks that groups 
perform better than individuals. For example, large groups are good at 
predicting the outcomes of elections or guessing the number of beans in 
a jar (Sunstein, 2006). However, these types of problems have concrete 
‘right’ answers, whereas the answers to social problems are rarely so 
clear cut (Funtowicz, 1993; Head, 2008). 
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As Homer-Dixon (2001) and Westley et al. (2007) have argued, it 
may be possible to address some of the most pressing social problems 
by producing social innovations – new approaches to tackling familiar 
problems when established answers and responses have proven inef-
fective. But are collective intelligence tools valuable to the production 
of social innovation? On the one hand, there are some promising 
indicators. Online networks are typically made up of diverse nodes 
that are weakly tied, exactly the sort of networks that should be 
effective at mobilising knowledge and resources (Granovetter, 1973). 
Furthermore, they tend to have relatively flat hierarchies and high 
degrees of autonomy for individual nodes, which is characteristic of 
innovative organisations (Mintzberg, 1991). Finally, because online 
networks are potentially open to anyone who has access to the inter-
net, they encourage a sharing of diverse knowledge sets that has been 
identified as critical to innovation, both technical (Arthur, 2009) and 
social (Mumford and Moertl, 2003; Mumford and Licuanan, 2004). On 
the other hand, it is becoming increasingly clear that online collective 
intelligence has serious limitations. For example, online groups tend to 
become polarised between opposing opinions when it comes to dealing 
with complex problems that are politically contested (Sunstein, 2006). 
Moreover, online groups struggle with tasks that require careful coor-
dination (Nielsen, 2012; Kittur, Lee, and Kraut, 2009). These factors 
suggest limitations in terms of how far collective intelligence may be 
able to drive social innovation, which typically aims to address prob-
lems that are the consequence of complex systems and that require 
changes in the flow of resources, authority and beliefs if they are to be 
addressed (Westley et al., 2007). 
This chapter draws on the work of Arthur (2009) and a number of 
social innovation scholars (Mulgan et al., 2007; Westley et al., 2007; 
Mumford, 2002), to provide a framework for examining how col-
lective intelligence can support social innovation. It divides social 
innovation into phases and mechanisms. It then explores how three 
existing collective intelligence platforms have promoted social inno-
vation. These three cases illustrate the different models that exist 
for tapping into collective intelligence online, with each one hav-
ing different strengths and weaknesses in terms of generating social 
innovation. This analysis suggests that using collective intelligence 
to produce social innovation is possible, but that no single collec-
tive intelligence platform is likely to be useful throughout the whole 
social innovation process. 
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The challenge of using collective intelligence 
to drive social innovation
Social innovation has been defined as ‘an initiative, product, process 
or program that profoundly changes the basic routines, resource and 
authority flows or beliefs of any social system’.1 Although this is just 
one definition, it shares much in common with those used by other 
authors working in this field (Mumford, 2002; Wheatley and Frieze, 
2006). What is particular about this perspective on social innovation 
is that it is ‘systemic’, meaning that it is concerned with the impact 
an innovation has on a whole social system, not just in the context 
of a particular organisation or industry. This kind of systemic change 
inevitably involves conflicts of interests, different perspectives on 
the system and the nature of the social problem, and unanticipated 
consequences due to unpredictable relations of cause and effect. In 
short, and using the language of systems perspectives, social innova-
tion is ‘complex’ (Westley et al., 2007; Duit and Galaz, 2008; Pierre 
and Peters, 2005).
So, from this viewpoint, complexity is inevitable when dealing 
with social innovation. This is a problem for collective intelligence 
(Nielsen, 2011; Sunstein, 2006; Sunstein, 2007). In order to mobilise 
collective intelligence, participants must be able to share and commu-
nicate information in such a way that the specialised knowledge that 
each individual possesses can be combined into a coherent whole or 
‘answer’. There are two characteristics that a problem can have that 
make this easier. 
Collective intelligence is easier to apply when the amount of coor-
dination between participants required to solve a problem is minimal 
(Kittur, 2008; Kittur et al., 2009). In some applications of collective 
intelligence, each individual only needs to supply their best answer to a 
problem, with the collective answer being determined by the average of 
all the responses. This is called a ‘low coordination’ problem. Collective 
intelligence is more difficult to apply when new contributions only 
make sense in relation to what has gone before. A famous example of 
such a ‘high coordination’ project was the publishing house Penguin’s 
attempt to write a book using an online collaboration platform, which 
largely failed (Kittur et al., 2009; Pulinger, 2007).
Collective intelligence is also easier to apply when a problem has a 
definite answer, one that is clearly recognisable when it is found, and 
where the method for finding it is known and agreed on by the group 
(Nielsen, 2011). This is also called an ‘intellective’, as opposed to a 
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‘judgmental’, task (see Laughlin and Adamopoulos, 1982). Typically, the 
former condition holds in fields like mathematics where it is possible 
to distinguish clearly between a correct and a wrong answer, and there 
is a common praxis shared by those working in the field for arriving 
at problem solutions. However, this may not be the case when dealing 
with social problems where the difference between right and wrong 
may be based on value judgements not shared by all involved, and 
where there is a lot of uncertainty surrounding what is known about 
a problem (Funtowicz, 1993). Collective intelligence becomes increas-
ingly difficult to employ when incorporating knowledge from different 
academic disciplines or non-scientific knowledge based in traditional 
cultures (Berkes, 2008) or unarticulated lay practices. It is almost 
impossible when the knowledge that one party professes to possess is 
dismissed as worthless by other parties, such as is common in highly 
politicised or value-laden debates (Head, 2008).
Social innovation meets neither of these conditions. It is complex, 
with high coordination requirements, and requires judgmental evalu-
ations. As such, it is tempting to say that social innovation is simply 
not a good arena to use collective intelligence. However, a deeper look 
at how social innovation happens makes this conclusion appear less 
certain.
The process of social innovation
Social innovation is still an emerging field of study and, thus, there are 
still relatively few papers dealing with how social innovation happens 
from a systemic perspective (Mumford and Moertl, 2003). However, 
there are other disciplines that look at innovation in complex systems – 
especially research into socio-technical systems – that can offer use-
ful conceptual frameworks for understanding this phenomenon. This 
chapter describes the process of social innovation with reference to 
social innovation theory (Wheatley and Frieze, 2006; Westley et al., 
2007; Westley and Antadze, 2010; Mumford, 2002), as well as work on 
socio-technical systems (e.g., Geels and Schot, 2007; Geels, 2005; Smith, 
Stirling and Berkhout, 2005), and especially the work of Arthur (2009).
Scholars of innovation in complex systems tend to break the pro-
cess into three (Mumford, 2002; Arthur, 2009) or four phases (Westley 
et al., 2013). Table 9.1 presents three phases of social innovation. At 
each phase there are crucial mechanisms for making the innovation 
successful. These mechanisms are described in greater detail in the 
paragraphs below.
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The ‘invention’ stage is when a new innovation is first born. Most 
theorists propose that innovations are born out of new combinations 
or recombinations of existing ideas, practices, technologies and other 
elements, to produce new and surprising outcomes. Mumford notes 
that social innovation seems to emerge most often when modes of rea-
soning that are common in one domain are applied to surprising effect 
in another domain (Mumford and Moertl, 2003). The invention phase 
can be encouraged by fostering the exchange of ideas and information 
between individuals working in different domains. Arthur (2009) argues 
that the greater the number of existing technologies, the more potential 
re-combinations there are – so the faster innovation happens. 
Invention is followed by ‘development’, in which the initial idea is 
adapted to its purpose. In some cases this involves finding a previously 
unexplored application for an existing technology or idea (Cohen et al., 
1972; Arthur, 2009). Often this stage of development involves linking 
the invention to other ideas that help to refine it. As both Westley et 
al. (2007) and Arthur (2009) have noted, successful innovations often 
consist of clusters of products, programmes and processes that come 
together to allow the invention to fulfil its purpose. 
Developing an innovation requires an investment of time and, usu-
ally, both human and financial capital. Finding resources for fledgling 
ideas is difficult. Innovation scholars have noted the importance of 
‘niches’ in protecting innovations during this growth period (Schot 
and Geels, 2007; Smith, 2006; Kemp et al., 1998). Such niches may be 
housed within larger organisations and institutions, as spaces reserved 
for radical innovation, or they can be small markets where the innova-
tion has a limited application that does not reflect its systems changing 
potential. Related to the concept of a niche is the concept of a ‘shadow 
network’ (Olsson et al., 2006). Shadow networks are groups of indi-
viduals who work together to develop an innovation, often without 
Table 9.1 Phases and mechanisms of social innovation
Phase of social innovation Associated mechanisms
Invention (Re-)combination; exchange of information 
and ideas between different domains
Development Matching problems and solutions; 
clustering; niches; shadow networks
Implementation Cross-scale networks; institutional 
entrepreneurship
Source: Author’s compilation.
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compensation, in order to create an alternative to the existing way of 
doing things. Sometimes shadow networks can exist for a long time, 
developing and utilising an idea before it ever enters the mainstream. 
For example, in Chile, artisanal fishers had to wait sixteen years before 
the collapse of the dictatorial regime allowed them to replace existing 
fisheries policy with their own ideas (Gelcich et al., 2010).
The third stage is institutionalisation and ‘regime shift’. As Westley 
et al. noted (Westley et al., 2007; Westley and Antadze, 2010), in order 
to establish themselves, innovations often need to access resources and 
opportunities that are located outside the system in which they are 
operating. While resistance to change within a system may be high, 
there may be opportunities at other levels to build support for the inno-
vation. This means that an actor trying to achieve change within a local 
context may find it necessary to look outside the system they are trying 
to change in order to find support. Just as within the legal system a rul-
ing may be appealed and overturned in a higher court, a social innova-
tor may be able to approach national or international organisations for 
help. In the example of the Great Bear Rainforest in Western Canada, 
environmental organisations were able to put pressure on logging com-
panies acting in the region by targeting the international buyers of their 
timber products (Tjornbo et al., 2010). The ability to reach outside the 
system in this way is greatly facilitated by the creation of networks that 
span administrative and geographic boundaries. These can be created 
by both formal partnerships and informal connections (Moore and 
Westley, 2011; Slaughter, 2004).
An innovation may have to wait before it has an opportunity to estab-
lish itself, but agents can work actively to look for opportunities to find 
resources at other scales. Throughout the innovation process, but par-
ticularly at the institutionalisation phase, the success of the innovation 
is heavily dependent on the support and skills of agents, often called 
institutional entrepreneurs, who are skilled at finding these kinds of 
opportunities (Dorado, 2005; Levy and Scully, 2007; Child et al., 2007). 
Institutional entrepreneurs help innovations to secure resources to grow 
and are adept at finding opportunities to establish them in systems 
(Westley et al., 2013, Mumford, 2002). 
According to the definition of social innovation provided above, a 
social innovation can only be described as such if it moves through 
all of these three stages (although not necessarily consecutively – since 
they can occur simultaneously or even out of order on occasion). 
Thus, all of the mechanisms described above are important to a social 
innovation’s progress. However, no single organisation or institution 
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has to carry out all of these activities. Westley et al. (2013) argued that 
agency in social innovation processes is best understood as a distributed 
quality, where many different actors are involved in making a social 
innovation happen, contributing different skills at different times. 
Collective intelligence platforms are not agents in themselves, rather 
they are mechanisms that can help to mobilise and coordinate agency. 
Moreover, different types of platform might provide support to social 
innovation at one phase, without being useful throughout the whole 
process. 
The role of collective intelligence platforms in social 
innovation: Three case studies
Collective intelligence platforms are virtual spaces, usually websites – 
though they can also take the form of mobile applications – that are set 
up in order to allow people to come together to work on common prob-
lems in ways that require the mobilisation of knowledge and creativity. 
A recent study identified three main types of collective intelligence plat-
form (Tjornbo, 2013): challenge grants, innovation communities and 
open innovation platforms. This chapter explores, qualitatively, what 
role each of these different kinds of platform might play in promoting 
social innovation and to what extent they have been successful in doing 
so. This chapter examines one leading example of each of these types 
of collective intelligence platform. Platforms were selected on the basis 
that they had large memberships, had attracted financial resources and 
had achieved recognition in the media (measured by the number of hits 
generated by a Google ‘news’ search). The aim of looking at these sites 
was to answer two questions: 
1. To what extent are these innovation platforms already producing 
social innovations?
2. How well are these three different types of online innovation plat-
forms adapted to the task of stimulating social innovation and to 
what extent do they represent mechanisms of social innovation in 
action?
Each case is now considered in turn.
Challenge grants: Innocentive
Challenge grants are perhaps the most established model for regularly 
accessing the innovative capacity of virtual social networks. A challenge 
Can Collective Intelligence Produce Social Innovation? 199
grant allows those facing a problem to put out an open call for potential 
solutions. Anyone who thinks they have a solution to the challenge 
can submit a proposal and they typically compete with other ‘solv-
ers’ to win a cash prize for the best solution, either determined by the 
‘challenger’ or by an independent jury. Challenge grants require some 
coordination since ‘solvers’ have to meet the expectations of the ‘chal-
lengers’. This becomes more difficult depending on the nature of the 
challenge issued. However, as the example of Innocentive illustrates, 
while the challenge grant approach is most easily applicable to simpler, 
technical challenges, it does still have some application for complex 
social challenges. 
Operational since 2001, Innocentive is undoubtedly one of the larg-
est open innovation platforms. Over 1,650 challenges, worth over 
$40,000,000 in total, have been posted on the site, and Innocentive can 
boast some notable successes. For example, it has produced breakthroughs 
in oil spill clean-up and in treating Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS).2 
Like most challenge grants, the principal aim of Innocentive is to connect 
people with a problem to those who think they might have an answer. 
The majority of challenges posted on Innocentive are purely techni-
cal in nature. However, some of the challenges concern social problems 
and could potentially produce social innovation. To identify such 
challenges, three criteria were set out based on the definition of social 
innovation above: challenges could be defined as potentially producing 
social innovation if they concerned a social problem; took a holistic/
systemic view of the problem; and invited solutions with a potentially 
radical impact on the way that problem was tackled, that is, they did 
not constrain problem solvers to work within an existing mode of prac-
tice. Challenges listed on Innocentive were then evaluated to identify 
those that met the criteria. As well as the author, a second researcher 
performed the same evaluation in order to reduce the subjectivity of the 
judgement. Based on these criteria, four Innocentive challenges out of 
the 138 challenges active at the time of the research were identified as 
supporting social innovation.
These 138 challenges only present a snapshot of the activities of 
Innocentive. However, using the same criteria to look at the most suc-
cessful problem solvers involved in Innocentive over the last five years 
also gives an indication of the primary activities of the site. Between 
2007 and 2011 not one ‘top solver’ was involved in challenges that 
could be described as socially innovative.3 
While Innocentive indulges in some social innovation, the data does 
not tell us how successful the platform is in this arena. Innocentive’s 
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general measure of success is that 85% of challenges find winning 
solutions, but there is no such figure that focuses solely on social inno-
vations. Nevertheless, two of Innocentive’s high-profile success stories 
involve social innovation. The first was a challenge to find new ways of 
providing education to populations in poor and developing countries4 
and the second was a challenge to find a means of measuring ‘human 
potential’.5 Thus, although social innovation is just a small part of 
Innocentive’s activities, it is possible to use the Innocentive model to 
stimulate social innovation.
Innocentive’s success seems to hinge on its ability to leverage two 
of the core mechanisms of social innovation: matching problems and 
solutions and exchanging information across domains. The challenge 
grant structure is also suited to innovation in that it opens problems up 
to a wide audience of potential solvers. A typical way for an organisa-
tion or individual to attempt to find a solution to a problem might be 
to hire a consultant or other experts in the particular field it is operat-
ing in, but these people are often too committed to existing ways of 
operating or established best practices to generate truly innovative ideas 
(Nielsen, 2011). As the literature on social innovation suggests, innova-
tion is usually the product of the novel combination of adjacent fields 
of knowledge (Arthur, 2009). This certainly holds true for Innocentive, 
where many winning solutions have come from experts in fields differ-
ent from that of the challenger (Nielsen, 2011).
However, while Innocentive might be good at stimulating new inven-
tions, it seems to be poor at supporting innovations through to implemen-
tation (Tjornbo and Westley, 2012). Once a solution has been matched to 
a problem, there is not much more support available from Innocentive 
in terms of developing the idea. The section of the site entitled ‘Solver 
Resources’ mostly contains a few brief articles on the basics of how to 
answer challenges. There are built-in supports for people hoping to partner 
with others in designing their solution and an online forum where mem-
bers of Innocentive can chat about a broad range of topics, but these tools 
seem to have limited impact. The global forum, for example, sees a new 
topic opened at most once or twice a month and most of these receive two 
or fewer replies. At the time of writing, the first three posts in this forum 
were all observations about how difficult it is to form a team.6 Based on 
a sample of twenty randomly selected challenges, the average number of 
public comments in the public project rooms is less than three. This sug-
gests that Innocentive is not effective in building shadow networks. 
In addition, Innocentive does not have built-in tools to help inno-
vations establish themselves in broader systems. Once a solution is 
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accepted by a challenger, then the role of the site, and possibly of the 
innovator, may be over. There is no systematic attempt to encour-
age the involvement of institutional entrepreneurs, to develop such 
skills, or to look for cross-scale opportunities. All of this is left up to 
the challenger or innovator. Thus innovations may fail because of a 
lack of resources or because the innovator is not able to help tailor 
the innovation to its particular application. The two successful social 
innovations profiled on the site were achieved in partnership with 
The Economist magazine, which may have helped to raise the profile 
of the competitions. 
Innovation communities: Open Source Ecology
Innovation communities do not promote innovation generally; rather, 
they focus on a single problem and attempt to find solutions to it. The 
emphasis in these groups is not on generating ideas but on fine-tuning 
them and seeing them successfully implemented. Unlike the other types 
of innovation platform, therefore, innovation communities rely heav-
ily on their ability to coordinate action. This can be accomplished in a 
number of different ways. For example, although it is not an innova-
tion community per se, Wikipedia has been very successful at coordi-
nating large numbers of individuals in accomplishing a shared project 
by developing an elaborate set of rules and guidelines for evaluating 
articles, with a dedicated group of volunteer moderators who do most 
of the work of editing articles (Butler et al., 2008). In order to succeed, 
it needs to keep volunteers motivated and prevent fragmentation of the 
project (Hertel et al., 2003; Mustonen, 2003). 
Open Source Ecology (OSE) was born from the frustration experienced 
by one man: farmer, technologist and physicist Marcin Jakubowski. 
When he was unable to repair his brand tractor that broke down fre-
quently, he designed a cheap, robust and easily repairable alternative 
that could be built entirely using locally available materials. He then 
made the blueprint for this new tractor available to the public. His work 
attracted outside attention and supporters and soon expanded into the 
vision of the Global Village Construction Set (GVCS), a set of blueprints 
for 50 machines that could be built and maintained locally on a small 
scale. Jakubowski’s farm became the site of a community dedicated to 
producing blueprints and prototypes of these machines, and their work 
attracted the interest of others, like TED, who gave Jakubowski a plat-
form to share his idea. Jakubowski’s TED talk describing Open Source 
Ecology has had over a million views at the time of writing7 and helped 
launch a community on the global stage.
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The OSE project is a social innovation in itself as it is a radical 
reconceptualisation of manufacturing that turns its back on the cen-
tralisation and global supply chains of the mainstream economy and 
is a direct response to concerns about the social and environmental 
impacts of globalisation and the consumer economy. In order to make 
this possible it relies on many different types of community support. 
Some of this is financial, as provided by the hundreds of ‘True Fans’ 
who contribute ten dollars a month to the project,8 but much of it relies 
on collective intelligence. The blueprints for the GVCS machines are 
open source and have been developed by a virtual network of contribu-
tors as well as those working on the farm. A few early adopters have also 
created these machines and provided feedback on how they need to be 
improved.9 Although it is still in its infancy, OSE has been developing a 
coherent alternative to a society based on centralised industrial produc-
tion and demonstrates that innovation communities can play a role in 
social innovation. 
The idea for OSE was generated by Marcin Jakubowski and, as such, 
people who become involved in the OSE project are attracted by the 
idea of the Global Village Construction Set and share at least some of 
Jakubowski’s values. This reduces a lot of the complexity inherent in 
using collective intelligence for social innovation and is, perhaps, what 
allows OSE to work as a social innovation platform. 
Web platforms like OSE make use of collective intelligence during the 
‘development’ phase of social innovation. The farm became a ‘niche’ 
that attracted resources, both financial and in the shape of talented 
volunteers, who came to work at the farm, as well as those who con-
tributed to development online. These resources soon saw the produc-
tion of a cluster of innovations (different prototypes of Global Village 
Construction Set machines). OSE became the focus of one of the early 
crowdfunding campaigns (online platforms that allow members of the 
public to support projects with small donations), with 500 support-
ers creating a small monthly revenue for Jakubowski (Thomson and 
Jakubowski, 2012). One of the volunteers at the farm won a Thiel ‘20 
Under 20’ Fellowship of $100,000 to allow him to continue his work on 
the farm. By using crowdfunding, OSE explored ideas that would not 
be supported by mainstream funding organisations, whether private or 
philanthropic (Thomson and Jakubowski, 2012). However, its success 
depended entirely upon its ability to build a committed ‘shadow net-
work’ of supporters.
The lesson from other similar online projects is that these ini-
tiatives must attract both casual volunteers and a core group of very 
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committed enthusiasts (Howe, 2006). In the case of Wikipedia, while 
casual volunteers create the bulk of new material, it is a small group of 
‘moderators’ who ensure that articles abide by Wikipedia’s standards 
and maintain a consistent style (Kittur et al., 2007). 
In the case of OSE, the project received a big boost after Jakubowski 
was invited to make a presentation at TED. This brought a significant 
amount of interest to the project and an infusion of extra investment 
and resources (Thomson and Jakubowski, 2012). The central premise 
of the OSE project caught on and led to an expansion of the idea into 
new locations, a process social innovation scholars sometimes refer to 
as ‘scaling out’ (Westley and Antadze, 2010). A shadow network grew 
up around the OSE project, through the OSE forums and wiki. Most 
significantly, this included a German OSE node with its own OSE Wiki 
and active forums.10
However, the core OSE community has not been consistently strong. 
Recently, the OSE fora have not been particularly active.11 Even more 
significantly, the OSE farm has gone through periods of inactivity, with 
the last of the initial volunteers having departed in February 2013. The 
reasons for this collapse appear to be partly related to the leadership of 
Jakubowski.12 The problems associated with a charismatic leader who is 
at first instrumental to the growth of a new initiative, but later comes 
to limit it, are well known and documented in the management litera-
ture (Westley et al., 2007). Such leaders are often able to attract support 
because of the strength of their vision but may be reluctant to adapt their 
ideas to specific contexts, tend to stifle creativity in their followers and 
can ultimately strangle the innovation they championed. From other 
open source projects it is clear that a horizontal and non-hierarchical 
leadership style is essential to maintaining such communities. 
Despite a lack of more recent activity, the OSE project is not a failure. 
The central idea has been considerably developed since Jakubowski first 
invented it, and a network has grown up around it so that work is now 
being continued in other locations. However, there may be a tension 
between maintaining the kind of intense community needed to sustain 
a project like the OSE and the activities associated with institutionalis-
ing an innovation, such as identifying opportunities for cross-scale 
interactions. 
Open innovation platforms: TED
Open innovation platforms are platforms that publicise people’s good 
ideas. At their simplest, they are open message boards where anyone 
is free to submit their proposals for public scrutiny. More typically 
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however, they also encourage visitors to comment on ideas and to vote 
for those they like, thus giving the ‘best’ ideas greatest prominence. 
Open innovation platforms do not draw much use from collective 
intelligence directly, since most ideas are the product of a single mind 
or a small team rather than a large group. However, in allowing for 
comments on ideas, they create opportunities for collaboration. More 
importantly, by spreading ideas effectively, they may open people up to 
a greater diversity of ideas, invigorating recombination processes. 
TED is the largest open innovation platform in terms of visitors. It 
started in 1984 as an organisation that put on conferences bringing 
together speakers from the worlds of technology, entertainment and 
design. Today, it is mostly famous for the videos of its talks available 
online through its website. It currently hosts over 19,000 talks, and 
some of the most popular have over 20 million views.13 TED differs 
from standard open innovation platforms in that only specially selected 
invitees are able to share their ideas, which are carefully curated to fit 
the TED format. It also has an unusually sophisticated multimedia dis-
tribution platform. 
TED works well as a social innovation platform. Several of the talks 
on the site promote ideas that are intended to tackle social problems, 
take a holistic, systemic approach and have potentially radical implica-
tions, such as Ken Robinson’s14 proposal to reform education systems 
in the West to put more emphasis on creativity or George Papandreou’s 
proposal for a Europe without political borders.15 This is not to say 
that TED is exclusively or even mainly a social innovation platform. 
The most common talk topics on TED are those related to its core areas – 
technology (558 talks), entertainment (272) and design (326), with the 
only exceptions being science (421) and business (278). Topics like poli-
tics (146), health (124) and poverty (44) lag far behind.16 
The greatest strength of TED is its ability to communicate ideas. 
The most popular TED talks garner huge audiences, while talks with 
hundreds of thousands of viewers are fairly commonplace. At the most 
fundamental level, simply exposing people to a variety of ideas makes 
them more likely to come up with innovative recombinations (Arthur, 
2009). Moreover, exposure often brings additional resources, as shown 
in the OSE example. 
Although originally, TED’s design was not directed at harnessing col-
lective intelligence to spur social innovation, over time, it has evolved 
and added tools to develop ideas beyond the talks. One such tool is 
the forum, which allows for commentary on the talks. Of the three 
case studies here, TED has the most active forum, with the number of 
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comments on a talk often numbering tens or hundreds (as opposed to 
OSE and Innocentive, which often only had a few comments). There is 
scope through these discussions to develop ideas further and to create 
clusters. However, so far, this activity has not been typically systematic, 
nor carried out with a particular end goal in mind.
Another development has been the TED Prize. The Prize is essentially 
a form of challenge grant where one individual is awarded $1 million 
for a plan that proposes a solution to a problem that will ‘change 
the world’ for the better. To date there have been nineteen TED Prize 
Winners, tackling topics such as nutrition in schools and marine pro-
tected areas.17 Yet another innovation promoting development is the 
TED Fellows Programme, which is focused on supporting the work of 
young innovators.18 
Largely, the impetus for these kinds of developments has come from 
the TED community. At the time of writing this online network had 
149,441 members and its own forum. Moreover, TED receives feedback 
from the participants at its physical conferences. Much of this feedback 
concerns a desire to see the ideas at TED put into action with the sup-
port of the talented people in the room and the resources they have 
access to. A striking example of this potential came in the form of the 
Mission Blue project. This began with a TED talk from Sylvia Earle, who 
argued for the creation of a series of marine-protected areas to help 
build the resilience of ocean ecosystems around the globe. The speech 
garnered a huge amount of support, including a $1,000,000 pledge from 
philanthropist Addison Fischer. It also led to a voyage, with passengers 
made up of scientists, philanthropists and celebrities, which raised over 
$15 million.19
These examples show that TED has a potentially powerful ability to 
build cross-scale networks able to advocate strongly for social innova-
tion. Another example of this came in the form of the TED Challenge 
(part of TED 2013), where small interdisciplinary groups worked 
together, with notable successes, to create action on a range of issues 
from vaccination to sex trafficking. 
Thus far though, the kinds of deliberate activities described here are 
the exception rather than the rule. At its core, TED remains an idea 
promoter, not an advocacy organisation. Most of the attendees at TED 
conferences are scientists and business people rather than politicians, 
and TED remains committed to a politically neutral perspective. In fact, 
perhaps, there is a tension between TED’s role as a promoter of ideas 
and as a place of community building and its potential role as an agent 
of institutional entrepreneurship and advocacy. 
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Conclusion
Despite the complex nature of social innovation processes and the lim-
ited theoretical literature exploring the phenomenon, it is clear from 
the case studies presented here that collective intelligence has a role to 
play in promoting social innovation, both directly and indirectly. All 
three of the web platforms examined here promoted social innovation 
to some extent. Innocentive – the challenge grant example – featured 
a small sample of social innovation challenges and at least two exam-
ples of successfully launched social innovations. OSE – the innovation 
community example – took a radically alternative model of produc-
tion and self-sustainability and not only considerably developed the 
idea with several prototypes, but also created a global shadow network 
dedicated to taking it further. Finally, TED – the open innovation plat-
form example – publicised several social innovations and helped them 
to gain greater prominence and resources. TED also created an online 
community dedicated to seeing some of these socially innovative ideas 
realised in practice. It has occasionally helped to build cross-scale net-
works to support the realisation process. 
At the same time, no single platform seems to be able to support a 
social innovation from invention through to implementation. In fact, 
each of these different types of platform seems particularly strong in 
one particular phase: invention in the case of TED and Innocentive, 
and development in the case of OSE. Moreover, none of these platforms 
utilised all of the mechanisms associated with any one phase and none 
were particularly active in the implementation phase, although TED 
seems to have the greatest potential in this area.
In many ways this reflects the strengths and limitations suggested by 
the theoretical literature in the introduction to this chapter. Collective 
intelligence platforms are indeed good at mobilising resources and 
sharing knowledge and creativity (e.g., TED and OSE); they can help 
realise the benefits of applying diverse knowledge sets to a single prob-
lem (Innocentive); and they are places where truly radical innovation 
can thrive (OSE). However, they have yet to demonstrate a capacity to 
be effective in the implementation phase where the ability to navigate 
complex political environments and form cross-scale networks com-
posed of diverse interest groups becomes crucial. It is interesting to 
note how successful OSE was at attracting a truly committed group of 
volunteers willing to invest a significant amount of time and resources 
into a shared vision. This is contrary to the expectation that online 
models are best at forming loose networks and this may be linked to the 
Can Collective Intelligence Produce Social Innovation? 207
hybrid nature of this platform which includes both online and offline 
components. 
All of the networks have weaknesses that could be addressed to help 
them become more successful engines of social innovation. Innocentive 
could become better at building the kind of community observed in 
OSE, which might lead to a greater degree of collaboration in develop-
ing innovations past the initial idea. OSE might benefit from becoming 
less reliant on the leadership of Marcin Jakubowski and the relatively 
insular OSE community, perhaps by promoting its ability to share ideas 
as widely as TED has done (and indeed its success is in part due to 
TED) and by finding new ways to attract resources (as Innocentive did). 
Finally, TED could, perhaps, benefit from finding concrete applications 
for ideas and forming a community willing to help make ideas a reality 
(there are signs that this is happening). However, in each of these cases 
the platform in question risks losing something by expanding its remit. 
Innocentive might become less diverse by building a stronger and more 
committed community; OSE might become fragmented by turning 
away from the vision that drives it; and a more action-oriented TED 
might come to be seen as a political actor rather than a neutral reposi-
tory of knowledge, reducing the breadth of its appeal.
Ultimately, perhaps it is very difficult for any single platform to be 
effective in all stages of the development of a social innovation. As might 
be expected, based on network theory, there are trade-offs involved in 
choosing to support either the formation of a strongly bonded com-
munity or shadow network or the formation of more loosely coupled 
cross-scale communities. Equally though, there are opportunities to draw 
on mechanisms that the platforms themselves were not doing enough to 
exploit, such as Innocentive’s failure to promote greater use of its forums 
or TED’s hesitation around mobilising its potential as a network organisa-
tion. Ultimately, this study suggests that those interested in promoting 
social innovation should make greater use of the full range of collective 
intelligence platforms in order best to use the strengths of each. However, 
it is acknowledged here that more work is needed to investigate further 
the patterns suggested by this exploratory study.
Notes
1. http://sig.uwaterloo.ca/about-the-waterloo-institute-for-social-innovation-
and-resilience-wisir#About%20SI. Accessed 25 September 2014.
2. http://www.innocentive.com/about-innocentive/innovation-solutions-of-
note and see also Nielsen (2011).
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 3. http://www.innocentive.com/for-solvers/top-solvers-2011. Accessed 26 November 
2014.
 4. http://www.innocentive.com/for-solvers/winning-solutions/21st-century-
cyber-schools-challenge. Accessed 26 November 2014.
 5. http://www.innocentive.com/for-solvers/winning-solutions/human-poten-
tial-index-challenge. Accessed 26 November 2014.
 6. https://www.innocentive.com/ar/board/solver. Accessed 1 June 2013.
 7. https://www.ted.com/talks/marcin_jakubowski. Accessed 26 November 2014.
 8. http://opensourceecology.org/wiki/True_fans. Accessed 26 November 2014.
 9. http://opensourceecology.org/wiki/FAQ. Accessed 26 November 2014.
10. http://opensourceecology.org/wiki/Germany. Accessed 26 November 2014.
11. http://forum.opensourceecology.org/discussion/1004/why-is-ose-so-quiet-
lately. Accessed 26 November 2014.
12. http://opensourceecology.org/wiki/Yoonseo_Blog. Accessed 26 November 
2014.
13. https://www.ted.com/talks. Accessed 24 November 2014.
14. http://www.ted.com/talks/ken_robinson_says_schools_kill_creativity.html. 
Accessed 25 September 2014.
15. http://www.ted.com/talks/george_papandreou_imagine_a_european_
democracy_without_borders.html. Accessed 25 September 2014.
16. https://www.ted.com/topics. Accessed 24 November 2014.
17. http://www.ted.com/pages/prize_about. Accessed 26 November 2014.
18. http://www.ted.com/fellows. Accessed 26 November 2014.
19. http://blog.ted.com/2010/04/13/ocean_hope_at_m/. Accessed 26 November 
2014.
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